Somalia: The Build Up to Chaos - Part One

In the first of a series of articles examining the present state of Somalia to be hosted by Hii Dunia, Lee Taylor examines the recent history of one of the World's most troubled states.

It seems Somalia once again has the opportunity to gain political legitimacy and security for a devastated people. Last year the UN approved a task force of 8,000 peacekeepers while about 10,000 Somali’s have been merged to form the Trans-Federal Governments (TFG) security force representing all the major clans of Somalia. However, there are still grave concerns that the hardest part of establishing peace to Somalia still lies ahead. Although the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) were defeated in with ease by the TFG and their backers, causing the UIC effectively dissolving itself on 27th December 2006 a power vacuum has been left across much of Somalia that the TFG has been unable to fill. This carries with it the dual threat that the UIC may seek to continue their cause through guerrilla warfare or that southern Somalia will return to clan based politics.

Moreover, much anger has already been directed at the TFG due to perceived clan discrimination as it has pursued policies that have alienated the Hawiye clan through the relocation of government to Jowhan and then to Baidoa from the capital Mogadishu. In many regions this has left the government according to the NGO Crisis Group “weak, unpopular and faction ridden” with fears that the power vacuum is once again to be filled by those warlords and elites that the UIC defeated less than a year ago.

Since 1991 Somalia has been labelled as a collapsed state. Somalia’s collapse since 1991 is the longest period any country has gone in modern history without a functioning government. Indicative of state collapse is not the disappearing but the changing of politics, altering its form, drawing from the traditional to conceive a new socio-political evolution.

With international help from Ethiopia, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the United States, Somalia is currently struggling to form a unified government after more than 15 years of clan warfare.

A number of explanations can be offered for the initial collapse and then continual failure to restore a legitimate state to Somalia. Both external and internal reasons have been cited such as criticisms that Somali leaders have been irresponsible, corrupt and unwilling to compromise on power. Others argue that Somali’s are fearful of a re-emergence of an authoritarian corrupt regime that would repress the populous so scupper efforts for a centralised state. A further explanation is that the traditional clan make-up of Somali society is incoherent with the ideals of a centralised state. Those that argue external factors may be the cause of Somalia’s difficulties blame neighbouring states such as Ethiopia for perpetuating state collapse within Somalia to serve their own interests. While others point the finger at western diplomatic and interventionist policy for being badly managed, ignorant and neglectful of Somalia’s difficulties.

The Barre Regime

During 1991 at Fukuyama’s supposed ‘End of History’ ideological plateau, Somalia was in the midst of large scale clan fighting comparable to civil war that sent Siad Barre’s ruling authoritarian regime fleeing from the capital Mogadishu. Barre’s regime had ruled over Somalia for 21 years following a violent seizure of power in October 1969 after the assassination of democratically elected president Abdirashid Ali Shamarke. Following the seizure of power Barre was appointed chairman and later the presidency of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. However, Somalia proved to be a country difficult to exert political control over, and as Barre’s regime extended its’ control upon Somalia its’ method of rule became increasingly authoritarian.

Siad Barre’s initially socialist regime became increasingly reliant upon methods of survivalist politics in an attempt to exert and extend political power and authority across the whole of Somalia. It denied Somali citizens the right to vote, destroyed any vestige of a legitimate and independent judiciary system and became evermore oppressive towards traditionally democratic institutions such as a free press and free speech. Moreover, Barre concentrated much of his political power and economic reform in and around Mogadishu and fertile southern river valleys, creating vast inequalities and in-balances in economic growth, giving rise to group rivalry for scarce resources outside of the capital. As the regime continued such a hard-line approach to governing Somalia, policy often depended upon creating clan divisions and sometimes inter-clan conflict through a method of divide and rule that led to the creation of evermore powerful enemies and competing factions that would lead Somalia to future collapse.

Cold War Politics

Somalia was a pawn of super power rivalry during the Cold War period. Both the US and the Soviet Union supported Siad Barres regime at one point or another. The two great powers of the day saw Somalia’s strategic location at the entrance of the Red Sea as an important oil route and a means of extending their influence in an unstable region. Having seized control from the democratically elected government and then declaring Somalia a Socialist state Siad Barre’s regime was quick to receive international support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped arm and aid Barre’s regime militarily through the 1970s as Barre sought support from the Soviet military to annex the majority Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia. However, when the Soviet Union switched its support to the new Marxist government in Ethiopia mid-way through the conflict Somalia lost the war. Defeat in the Ogaden war was catastrophic for the Barre regime. It ruined Somalia’s military, forcing Barre to abandon his dreams of a ‘greater Somali nation’ causing an upsurge in discontent within the Barre regime as well as leading to the formation of the first organized opposition group, the ‘Somali Salvation Democratic Front’ (SSDF).

During the 1980s the US, hoping to gain a greater influence in the destabilised region and counter strong Soviet influence in Ethiopia became a donor to the Barre regime. US support for the Barre regime was to last up to its collapse, providing both military and economic aid to fight insurgent warlords. The legacy of the Cold War left a lasting impact upon Somalia, creating a huge weapon surplus in Somali society due to military super-power support during the arms race. Such arsenal derived from Cold war patronage was often sold on the shadow economy during and immediately after the collapse of central government authority. This allowed some to accumulate vast amounts of wealth and weaponry while others were forced into circumstances of survival.

After losing patronage from the Soviet Union the Barre regime quickly aligned itself with the US and Italy. Foreign aid generated $2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 1989, more than any other African state’s aid per a capita at that time. However, most of the Somali population benefited very little from state led development as much of the generated wealth was siphoned off by the corrupt regime. An indication of the level of internal difficulty and corruption is that Somalia’s dependence on foreign aid for 90 per cent of its development spending . Moreover, when examined government spending in other areas not related to social development indicates possible reasons for the collapse, break-up and continuous lack of legitimate authority in Somalia after the disposal of the Barre regime.

Following the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 that brought with it the destruction of any remittance of central authority in Somalia since 1991, the world prepared to intervene. The Cold War had ended, Francis Fukuyama had declared man to have reached the end of his ideological evolution, and the world was to become safe place full of liberal democratic ideals. The new collective security paradigm following the end of the cold war conceived a new world order asserting greater emphasis upon global governance institutions, democratization and a neo-liberal global economy. The requirement for aid intervention further heightened in the case of Somalia as the collapsed state stood outside the teleological neo-liberal remit of development theory that still placed Somalia on an evolutionary path to fulfil a liberal development paradigm. Therefore, the response conceived by the international community was one of ‘mission creep’, a term coined from the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s to describe the changing goals of the intervention.

Written by Lee Taylor

Picture Credit: AP/ NY Times


Links & Resources:

Hii Dunia - Music & Exile: Somalia

International Crisis Group - Collection of artilces from this NGO regarding Somalia

Net Nomad - "Famine Threat Drives Thousands of Somalis From Homes"

Somaliland Forum - Site serving the widespread Somali Diaspora

The Somaliland Times - "Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Start of State Collapse"