Somalia: The Nature of the Conflict

Armed clashes were most destructive and widespread in Somalia between 1988-1992 due to the overthrowing of the Barre regime, extreme resource depravation and clans jostling for political position. However, throughout the course of the 1990s conflicts in Somalia altered radically. In the early 1990s conflict almost always was based upon inter-clan fighting, as the UNHCR reported “the first explosion came immediately in the wake of the fall of Mogadishu, when the victorious Hawiye started to kill all non Hawiye residents of the capital”. This was also the case in the South with widespread fighting between the Darood and Hawiye clans over control of territory and resources. The primary funding of such conflicts was through pillaging and looting defeated clan territories and villages. However, as early as late 1991 although generally more prevalent in the mid to late 1990s there was a sign that intra-clan quarrels would lead to further conflicts as the major Hawiye clan in Mogadishu split in two forming the ‘Abigal’ led by Ali Mahdi and the ‘Haber Gedir’ led by Hussein Farah Aideed. Such a split brought an onslaught of heavy fighting throughout various districts of the capital, making a quick restoration of peace impossible. Meanwhile, the Darood clan based in Southern Somalia also conceded to intra-clan fighting in and around the Southern coastal city of Kismayo. While inter-clan hostilities still prevailed in many other parts of the country such as at Baidoa between Rahanweyn and Hawiye clans. This has had a knock on affect upon ethnic topography that has become distorted in many parts of Somalia, especially the border regions due to migration and temporary settlement caused by the social strife resulting from clan conflict.

Throughout the 1990’s the break-up of different clan allegiances became the primary prerequisite for fighting. This had implications for Somalia’s battered social tissue. Atrocities against civilian populations began to decrease due to the localised nature of intra-clan conflict and the re-emergence of traditional based authority from clan elders, meaning that conflict crimes would be more likely to be punished through clan customary law (xeer) or the enforcement of blood payment (diya). Pillaging and looting also saw a decrease in intra-clan conflicts as less territory was gained in such clashes. This indicates that actions and interests in Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime have not remained fixed. It could also be argued the change of conflicts from one based upon ethnicity to one based upon interests will give external actors more leverage in building peace.

Clan based political actors such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Front (SNF) that emerged following the overthrowing of the Barre regime have since retreated from the political agenda in Somalia. This is partly due to the fracturing of ethnic divides and the breaking up of numerous lead organizations. An example being, the split in the mid 1990s of the USC, into the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Similar fracturing has led to a weakening of support and power for many of the warlords and militias since the years immediately after 1991, making those groups that once benefited smaller and more fractured.

Ken Menkhaus a professor of Political Science at Davidson College North Carolina claims most businessmen who initially profiteered from conflict have made a transition into more legitimate goods and commercial networks. Professor Menkhaus writing in the Review of African Political Economy indicates that recent armed conflict in Somalia is not so much driven by economic interests directly linked to warfare but rather, “parochial political agendas of individual leaders engaged in power struggles.” Moreover as previously mentioned this is often within their own sub-clan. Menkhaus further argues in his article in the Review of African Political Economy that Somalia’s continual collapse cannot be explained only by greed interests as they would profit more from an internationally recognised ‘paper state’, allowing them to attract foreign aid that the elites could pocket as was the case with much of the aid that was given to Somalia during the 1990s. This however is not the desire of many Somali clans, militias and businessmen, as attempts to establish a transitional government in Somalia have been met with an increase in armed conflict, as many groups remain with the capacity to spoil a peace process.


Links & Resources:

ROAPE - Review of African Political Economy homepage.

UNHCR - 'Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawl 1990 -1995'