Somalia: The Rise of the Clan

Genealogy lies at the heart of Somali social and clan systems exemplified by the Mareehaan clan who still revere former leader Said Barre as a hero due to his immediate link with them, overlooking his ruthlessness and political corruption. The map below (click to enlarge) shows Somalia’s six major ancestral clan families, that are the; Darood, and the Hawiye that are the most prevalent in and around the capital Mogadishu, the Isaaq who were severely persecuted by the Barre regime, the Dir, the Digil and the Rahanwayn. The Dir, Darood, Hawiye and the Isaaq are often livestock dependent and nomadic, making their organisational structures transient and fragile with shifting allegiances and informal networks formed to promote power, in non-fixed regions.

Academic Alex de Waal claims that IMF and World Bank policies of Structural Adjustment Programmes have had a negative impact on clan-ism, helping to lead Somalia to a state of collapse. De Waal argues that IMF and World Bank attempts to alleviate Somalia’s economic problems during the 1980s neglected clan culture and traditions imbedded in Somali tradition. Claiming that IMF policies instigated in Somalia weakened traditional systems of exchange between clans that developed an importance upon co-dependency and traditional clan values such as the authority of elders that could dictate clan actions, making them easier to control through diplomatic means. Moreover, de Waal further critics the World Bank and IMF reforms for being half-hearted, lacking any genuine attempt to develop and offset Somalia’s economic woes in the long run and causing a weakening of the formal economy and the state, “The economic policies forced upon Somalia by the Western donors aggravated the situation…, deflating the formal economy merely drove entrepreneurs into the informal economy” he claims in his paper.

With the absence of any state authority, warlords and local elites have gained social, political and economic power throughout Somalia, indicative of Vilfredo Pareto’s assertion “whenever the influence of public authority declines, little states grow up within states, little societies within societies”. This contravenes liberal global governance paradigms as non-state actors that are hostile or possibly just have alternative values and interests to the liberal peace agendas of; rule of law, human rights and democracy are seen to possess a challenge to the status quo of the international system. Moreover, institutions of global governance such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), states and trans-national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are concerned that the disintegration of state authority in one state threatens the stability of other regional states. However, sub-state networks of powerful groups are not new in African states. Often chiefs or regional warlords are able to trace their authoritative lineage which has allowed them to remain in control of economic incentives at the local level to pre-colonial times. Moreover, during colonialism powers often disseminated their power to regional elites and strongmen for administrative and political purposes. These combined have had an affect upon power networks within present day Somalia and since the collapse of the Barre regime.

The Implications of a Collapsed State

Following the collapse of central authority in Somalia there has been much debate concerning possible socio-economic developments which may be radically different to the neo-liberal model. Needless to say economic activity did not stop but rather altered, creating different nodes of economic authority dictated by and dictating that some accumulated vast amounts of wealth and resource, while many were forced into a daily routine of survival. However, such economic inequalities are not new to Somalia although economic prosperity became tied to a greater ability for power-entrepreneurship, as before those who had wealth also required ties to the state to exercise the same degrees of authority and political will. As a consequence of greater gains combined with fewer restraints informal cross border trade grew, linking the internal Somali economy with global economic linkages. This allowed many of Somalia’s border territories to remain on an economic plateau with some of its’ neighbouring states. Moreover, following the departure of all US and UN troops in mid 1995 the Somali economy actually improved, benefiting those that had links to informal patronage networks.

Somalia’s major economic sector, livestock, is well suited to a stateless system in a number of ways as there is a heavy reliance upon systems of kinship, and tradition making it more of a lifestyle for many Somali’s rather than merely a means to accumulate wealth. However, there is still a great divide between the Somalia of livestock, herdsman and petty trade and the Somalia of arms, warlords and conflict in economic and political capabilities. The lack of health and education facilities in part due to the conflict and partly due to rural Somali culture has weakened capacities for social progress and fluidity between groups that are involved in separate economic and social sectors. Moreover, intra-state conflicts by their nature are very divisive for inter-group or ethnic relations while also strengthening bonds within groups, leading to an increase in tension as well as greater inter group disparities. This takes on greater importance in Somalia as clan divisions can disrupt trade between regions, as trust is critical for trade when there is little or no legal enforcement.

State collapse allows for the emergence of different nodes of authority that are often independent of outside support or legitimating actors. Mark Duffield argues in his book “Global Governance and the New Wars” that to regard war solely as a form of aberration and breakdown fails to understand the complexities, significance and adaptive processes that take place behind the bloody curtains of intra-state conflicts. The development and transformation of society and objectives that alter in circumstances of social breakdown remain to a large extent un-critiqued by western academic literature due in part to the illegality of much of the activity. As Duffield argues, when images of state collapse, conflicts and suffering appear on the evening news it is hard to acquaint them with western ideals of progressive social adaptation and possible statehood formation. Furthermore, liberal global governance attempts at settling disputes have not adapted or acknowledged the radical alterations in civil conflicts. Liberal peace agendas still focus upon formal economic activity that in countries such as Somalia represents a contracted footing for development prospects and only indirectly engages much of the population. Moreover, market liberalisation programmes such as Structural Adjustment Programme’s (SAP’s) of the 1980’s and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIDPC) schemes in the 1990’s actually lessened the population’s reliance upon the state for basic needs such as education and health, further legitimising the informal networks as a means of survival.

A Change of Nature within Conflict

To fully analyse the extent to which economically driven patronage networks impact upon the collapse and continual breakdown of any vestige of legitimate central governance within Somalia, greater examination of the warring parties is required to understand how they are resourced and through what means they establish a legitimisation of authority. It is important to examine how elites and warring groups function politically and economically, how they are resourced, what security they provide. Armed clashes were most destructive and widespread in Somalia between 1988-1992 due to the overthrowing of the Barre regime, extreme resource depravation and clans jostling for political position. However, throughout the course of the 1990s conflicts in Somalia altered radically. In the early 1990s conflict almost always was based upon inter-clan fighting. This was also the case in the South with widespread fighting between the Darood and Hawiye clans over control of territory and resources. The primary funding of such conflicts was through pillaging and looting defeated clan territories and villages. However, as early as late 1991 although generally more prevalent in the mid to late 1990s there was a sign that intra-clan quarrels would lead to further conflicts as the major Hawiye clan in Mogadishu split in two forming the ‘Abigal’ led by Ali Mahdi and the ‘Haber Gedir’ led by Hussein Farah Aideed. Such a split brought an onslaught of heavy fighting throughout various districts of the capital, making a quick restoration of peace impossible. Meanwhile, the Darood clan based in Southern Somalia also conceded to intra-clan fighting in and around the Southern coastal city of Kismayo. While inter-clan hostilities still prevailed in many other parts of the country such as at Baidoa between Rahanweyn and Hawiye clans. This has had a knock on affect upon ethnic topography that has become distorted in many parts of Somalia, especially the border regions due to migration and temporary settlement caused by the social strife resulting from clan conflict.

Throughout the 1990’s the break-up of different clan allegiances became the primary prerequisite for fighting. This had implications for Somalia’s battered social tissue. Atrocities against civilian populations began to decrease due to the localised nature of intra-clan conflict and the re-emergence of traditional based authority from clan elders, meaning that conflict crimes would be more likely to be punished through clan customary law (xeer) or the enforcement of blood payment (diya). Pillaging and looting also saw a decrease in intra-clan conflicts as less territory was gained in such clashes. This indicates that actions and interests in Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime have not remained fixed. It could also be argued the change of conflicts from one based upon ethnicity to one based upon interests will give external actors more leverage in building peace.

Clan based political actors such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Front (SNF) that emerged following the overthrowing of the Barre regime have since retreated from the political agenda in Somalia. This is partly due to the fracturing of ethnic divides and the breaking up of numerous lead organizations. An example being, the split in the mid 1990s of the USC, into the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Similar fracturing has led to a weakening of support and power for many of the warlords and militias since the years immediately after 1991, making those groups that once benefited smaller and more fractured.

Ken Menkhaus a professor of Political Science at Davidson College North Carolina claims most businessmen who initially profiteered from conflict have made a transition into more legitimate goods and commercial networks. Indicating that recent armed conflict in Somalia is not so much driven by economic interests directly linked to warfare but rather, “parochial political agendas of individual leaders engaged in power struggles.” Moreover as previously mentioned this is often within their own sub-clan. Menkhaus further argues that Somalia’s continual collapse cannot be explained only by greed interests as they would profit more from an internationally recognised ‘paper state’, allowing them to attract foreign aid that the elites could pocket as was the case with much of the aid that was given to Somalia during the 1990s. This however is not the desire of many Somali clans, militias and businessmen, as attempts to establish a transitional government in Somalia have been met with an increase in armed conflict, as many groups remain with the capacity to spoil a peace process.

Written by Lee Taylor


Links & Resources:

Hawiye News - Colourful site for those interested in Hawiye Clan affairs

Hii Dunia - Previous Hii Dunia Somalia Articles

International Monetary Fund - IMF articles relating to Somalia

My Heart's in Accra - Ken Menkhaus's Insights into Somalia

Political Review Net - Review of Mark Duffield's 'The Merging of Development and Security'

University of Connecticut - 'Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy'