Somalia: A Fractured Nation

A woman held up a Koran at a recent rally in Mogadishu, at which people expressed opposition to having foreign peacekeepers based in Somalia. Picture Credit: Evelyn Hockstein for The New York Times

A deteriorating official economy, displaced and repressed people, a corrupt regime, a large shadow economy involving the large scale sale of small arms, and a severe draught dictating a severe scarcity of resources, came to ahead in Somalia in the early 1990s with disastrous consequences, according to George Ayittey President of the Free Africa Foundation “Armed thugs and bandits roamed the country, pillaging and plundering, and murderous warlords battled savagely for the control of the capital, Mogadishu. The carnage and the draught claimed over 300,000 lives, and heartbreaking spectacles of emaciated bodies of a famine that became the daily diet of the Western media”.

All of Somalia’s underlining problems exploded upon Somali society when Siad Barre’s regime was overthrown by the USC (United Somali Congress) and was replaced by an interim government led by Mohammed Ali Mahdi in 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed independence from Somalia breaking away to form Somaliland in the North, leaving the rest of Somalia fractured, stateless, and lawless, with an abundance of small arms from the Cold War era circulating on the shadow economy, as many sought security within clan identities. US and UN humanitarian intervention in early to mid 1990’s sought to reconcile the fragmentation of Somalia, but was criticised for making the situation worse. Foreign aid gave Somali warlords a greater ability to fund and continue violent offensives. Warlords exchanged aid for small arms upon the shadow economy creating new nodes of authority. Jacqueline Coolidge and Susan Ackerman writing for the World Bank noted “it is now understood that the politics of warlordism in Somalia is no more than a logical extension of the Siad Barre’s methods of wielding power…. Aid to Somalia has been part of the problem, not part of the solution.” Moreover, this has continued as foreign aid capital has been replaced by shadow economic networks.

According to a report in the Somaliland Times the main actors within the Somali conflict centre upon the control of property that enables them to generate, authority and profit through illicit infrastructure. Control of illegitimate airports, markets and bridges that carry a toll allows warlords to make a profit within the power vacuum left by the collapsed state. This makes fighting and power struggle within Somalia dependent upon material investment rather than notions of state building or political power struggle. The profits generated from illicit taxation allows Somali Warlords or businessmen that back the Warlords to buy arms from an endless list of willing sellers through illicit means. UN experts according to the Somaliland Times reported to the security council in 2003 that “Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, the Sudan, Yemen, Egypt , Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have given arms, money or training to Somali factions” at some point since 1991.

William Reno in a special piece for the Somaliland Times argues that the factors that have brought about the collapse and the continual fragmentation of the Somali state are not purely economical or clan based. He claims that institutions that have lasted the Somali conflict that have created violent and economic authority cannot be traced solely to structures within the collapsing state, ethnic lineage or clan families. Moreover, he claims orthodox structures of authority such as those who control the legal arrangements that exist within Somali society, world economic players and alliances with non state international actors are essential when attempting to understand the unorthodox social evolution of Somalia since the collapse of the state. Such institutions still exercise a degree of control over what and who is considered legitimate, who gets available resources and where coercion is exerted. Not discounting that Somali traders have continued economic and inter-clan networks of trust following the collapse of the state, with Somali scholars identifying at least 67 sub clans from the six major clan families that have formed defensive networks against predation since the 1990s, making clan lineage not necessarily detrimental to Somalia’s strife. For instance, oral history from the Jabba river valley outlines how loss of elder control over matters of matrimony will lead to disruption- as has been the case, while throughout other regions of Somalia (according to The Global Review of Ethnopolitics) “traditional clan structure … acted as a framework for identity the settlement of disputes and conflicts, and communal security”. However, it is undeniable that some clan structures have cooperated with violent entrepreneurial-ship activity, as by clan nature not all clan families have the same history or cultural heritage.

As the faltering Barre regime became more repressive in an attempt to hang on to power it led to a fracturing of security that to a large extent created privatised nodes of authority that would make transition to democratic rule more difficult. During the 1980s the regime began to privatise Somalia’s economic assets so that they would be tied to the regime, allowing the regime to administer authority through privileged economic networks. An example of this dates back to as early as 1975 when the regime expanded land tenure law, encompassing it in patronage networks, by giving legal legitimacy to those civil servants and businessman that could get government backing. This enabled them to claim traditional clan owned village that were not already being used for commercial farming. This has had an adverse affect especially upon southern inter-clan relations as the law was applied mostly to Southern lands destroying any autonomous traditional authority over resources. The severity of the situation meant that economic power, especially in primary export resources was now tied to a quickly fragmenting state. This has resulted in many of the most violent warlords that emerged post state collapse being part of patronage networks during the regime. An example being, General Mohammed Aydeed, a former elite within the Barre government during the 1980s, that with political backing giving him the authority to administer land in Southern river valleys, provided land on which ‘Mooryan’ (free lance armed groups), could settle. Moreover, those tied to Aydeed including his principle backer Osman Ato organized the looting of locally owned farmsteads before establishing militia controlled banana plantations that exported to Europe, providing financial support for his violent campaigns in Somalia after the collapse of the state. The already embedded networks of Southern elites meant that much of Northern Somalia was marginalized. However Barre still exercised control in the North through violent means arming Ogadeeni refugees to fight Isaaq communities that were thought to pose a threat to his rule. The control of those that posed a threat through violent armed groups made clans fight against each other down clan lineage divisions, destroying hope that stable political order would emerge after regime collapse. While illicit trades on the shadow economy promoted the fragmentation of Somalia and authoritative elements that may have had a hand in building a new order.

Rigid divides between communities formed as a result of outsiders disrupting and seizing local lands due to coercive policies created animosity and security dilemmas between communities. This forced people to seek protection from clan militias and outsiders that exploited land and resources to lead long-term violent campaigns and build rigidified ethnic in groups and out groups Moreover, since the collapse of the regime studies show that very few Somali’s have benefited from aid, with agriculture only receiving 22 percent of development spending in the 1980s, the vast majority of which was invested in large scale commercial farming in the South that was dominated by those with links to the Barre regime. The result of such un-equal and deprived spending in many parts of Somalia was that marginalized, disfavoured groups were forced to rely upon the shadow economy. This had a reinforcing affect upon warlords who participated in shadow economy activity to generate revenue for violent struggle.

The link between the Barre regime and patronage networks that dictated who controlled economic resources following the collapse of the regime meant that there was very little space for the emergence of indigenous resistance and traditional nodes of authority to stabilise Somalia. Groups that may have been able to resist the onslaught of ‘warlordism’ such as the Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO) based within the Shebelle and Jubba valleys representing the Bantu population, do not have the same access to the economic resources that were granted to warlords via patronage networks during the Barre regime. This can be seen as a taking away of responsibility of organized violence from clan division, and instead placing responsibility on regime malpractice. Moreover, it can be argued that a cause for the continuation of conflict in Somalia can actually be traced back to colonial influence that broke with customary networks of trade between what are now competing clans and regions. The same can be said upon the destruction of the traditional authority held by elders that influenced land and marriage arrangements, which helped haze ethnic lineage boundaries.


Links & Resources:

Free Africa Foundation - Washington Based NGO advocating "African Solutions for African Problems"

Hii Dunia - Previous Somalia articles

Somaliwide - Useful Somalian news source

The Somaliland Times - Online home of this English language important weekly paper

University of Denver - "The Collapse of Somalia and Economic Considerations" a paper by T. Craig Murphy

More For Less - Film Award Nomination

Filmmaker Sonal Sachdeva has been nominated for best documentary film at the ‘Reduction Festival’ for her excellent short film ‘More for Less’ shown on this site in July.

The film is the story of two men called Martin and Alf who have been living over the past few years from the excessive waste generated by other people. In their way they have chosen to go against the societal norm of having steady, paid jobs and yet survive comfortably by not participating in the process of earning money and adding to the burden of existing over-consumption.

Hii Dunia wishes Sonal the very best of luck and if you too would like to show your support for her film you can cast your vote here by going to the category marked 'Documentary'.


Links & Resources:

Filmakers For Conservation - Organisation of Environmental filmakers backing the Reduction Festival

green.tv - Site dedicated to hosting Environmental themed short films - including 'More For Less'

Hii Dunia - 'More For Less'

Reduction Festival - Festival Homepage

Vimeo - View more of Sonal Sachdeva's films

Can Zardari uphold Pakistani Democracy?

On Tuesday 9th September 2008 Asif Ali Zardari the husband of the former two times Prime Minister the late Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as President of Pakistan. Here Faisal Hanif asseses Zardari's past and asks if Pakistan's first democractic leader this century is fit and able enough to guide this most fragile of democracies through possibly its most difficult of days.




Becoming President seems the most unlikely of achievements for a man who was indicted on endless charges of corruption for the past decade before the assassination of his wife and spent many years in prison as a result. What makes Zardari’s victory even more remarkable is that until Benazir’s assassination he had been in exile from the country for most of the last decade and returned only upon the assassination of Ms Bhutto last December. Up until July 2008 he was still facing corruption charges and as early as last month he was part of a coalition government with Pervez Musharraf still in power as President. The election of Mr Zardari marks a most remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of a man who for most of his career has carried with him the most unceremonious title of Mr ten percent in depiction of his less than amicable business and political dealings. In fact before Ms Bhutto's death, Zardari’s public image was so bad that the Pakistan People’s Party went to great lengths to keep him out of the public eye as much as possible in the run up to February's general elections. Having so recently been seen as a liability for the PPP it is somewhat of a miracle that Zardari is in the position he now currently occupies.

This does not by any means imply that Mr Zardari has now gained immense popularity. On the contrary recent polls have suggested that forty four percent of the population rejected all three of the candidates in the general election. The PPP main opposition the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by former two times prime minister, Nawaz Sharif (still the most popular politician in the country) holds sway in Pakistan’s wealthiest and most populous region of Punjab. Zardari’s comprehensive victory in the Presidential election did not rely on the population vote but a parliamentary electoral system where members of both of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies and provincial assemblies decide on the new incumbent. Yet Zardari’s election as President has in the words of retired army General Talat Masood “made him the most powerful civilian President one can imagine." This is especially as he inherits a scope of powers that includes the ability to sack parliament, appoint army chiefs and control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Put it like that and many more would be indisposed to Zardari possessing the top job.

Unfortunately such simplistic notions do not hold sway over the ultimate factors that determine any politician’s fate especially in Pakistan. Asif Ali Zardari gained 480 of 702 Electoral College votes to give him victory and be sworn in as the fourteenth President of Pakistan in its sixty year history. A clearly delighted Zardari proclaimed the victory as a completion of the democratic process. Flanked by his two daughters, supporters and members of the PPP shouted slogans of ‘long live Bhutto’ in memory of their martyred leader. The assassination of Ms Bhutto has no doubt impacted on Zardari’s rise to president. Her death invigorated a fragmented political opposition in Pakistan which had failed to provide any serious opposition to Musharrafs’ reign as President. Yet it also provided Mr Zardari with a platform as de facto leader of the Pakistan’s largest political party to wield control. In the aftermath of Bhutto’s assassination Zardari’s accession has represented all the hall marks of a Machiavellian type politics to not in his words complete democracy but form a political dynasty led by him and allied to Bhutto name.

The story of this perceived cunningness begins in the immediate aftermath of Ms Bhutto’s assassination with the publication of her will which Zardari claimed to have. Her perceived wish was for her husband to take up the leadership of the political party. This is somewhat remarkable especially as mentioned Bhutto herself and the PPP had gone to great lengths to distance Zardari’s involvement with the party or politics in the aftermath of her return to Pakistan. Secondly given Zardari political liability and his status as a relative novice in such high office the decision seemed a strange one to say the least. What happened next was even more remarkable in that Asif Ali Zardari declined to accept such office and passed on the reigns to his nineteen year old son Bilawal. This was just as astonishing as Pakistan’s largest political party was to be headed by an Oxford undergraduate who had spent most of his life outside of Pakistan and had no political experience what so ever. The genius of such a manoeuvre on Zardari’s part was twofold. Firstly this was a man who realized his legitimacy for such high office was susceptible given his past dealings especially as at this point corruption charges continued to linger over him. To accept such a position without challenge would no doubt have led to the previous rhetoric of a devious and power hungry businessman come to the foe. Yet this is not a man who was about to let the opportunity of power slip so easily. In a supposed gesture of humility Zardari declined the position that his wife had anointed for him and passed the buck to his teenage son. Pakistani law does not allow someone so young to take up such high office and Zardari was not oblivious to this fact. While naming his son as a titular head for the time being Zardari would take up day to day running of the party and soon the country. He also announced that his children would from now forth be known by the name of Bhutto Zardari as opposed to the latter singular. Zardari use of Benazir’s death was symbolic making sure that the legacy of the Bhutto name would continue with him as its torch bearer. The famous Pakistani religious and political commentator Tariq Ali stated this in no uncertain terms in an article published in the Independent newspaper the day after Ms Bhutto’s assassination as he wrote "the Pakistan People's Party is being treated as a family heirloom, a property to be disposed of at the will of its leader,… the deadly angel who guided her when she was alive was, alas, not too concerned with democracy. And now he is in effect leader of the party."

What came next was an ingenious manipulation in the turmoil of Benazir’s death which would lead Zardari towards the top position. This was held at the time by Musharraf and first he must be got rid of. To do this Zardari called for unity on all sides to restore democracy in Pakistan. This meant allying himself with the traditional foe and influential ex Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This was a major coop as Sharif had perhaps a bigger axe to grind with the man whom he had appointed Army Chief and who later would dispose of him as leader of the country. This did not prove too difficult a job as firstly elections in the aftermath of Benazir’s assassination scored an inevitable victory for the PPP. The beneficiary it seemed was a Yousaf Raza Gillani vice chairman of the PPP who was drafted in as Prime Minister to complete what Zardari referred to as the first phase of restoration of democracy. This was another surprising decision to say the least. Firstly as Gillani was elected in front of the universally popular Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim who had been de facto head of the PPP for eight years of Benazir Bhutto’s exile and whose election record is 7-0 as a member of parliament. It is no exaggeration to suggest that this was the man most qualified and legitimised to take over as leader of the PPP after Bhutto’s death. On March 15th 2008 Fahim himself said that he did not understand why the PPP had still not named him as its candidate. It is clear why as this was an influential man well liked by the people who would not be susceptible to manipulation by any other. What Zardari required was a puppet and despite such a bold and controversial interpretation such a claim can be emphasised by Mr Gillani’s arrival in Washington where upon he was greeted by none higher than Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher. Many news agencies reported on the lack of diplomatic courtesies extended towards Mr Gillani and his entourage who were told to remain on the plane while Mr Gillani and his wife looking rather perturbed walked to a welcome shed instead of the usual complimentary chauffer driven experience handed to state officials. It says much of the standing of an individual who despite heading a vital United States ally in foreign affairs not to mention a nuclear state is given such a lack of prominence upon a state visit. Notably Zardari’s visit as President a few months later did not see the absence of any of the usual pomp that accompanies significant world leaders.

The coalition government with an elected PM was now in a very strong position to get rid of Musharraf. Yet this coalition existed on a number of stipulations on Sharif’s part. Firstly the disposed Supreme Court judges that had caused such an up roar with in the country and in turn signaled the beginning of the end of Musharrafs rule where to be reinstated. Of course it was under this same judiciary that allegations pertaining to outstanding corruption charges against Zardari where still pending. With this condition agreed to but later not met and Sharif’s instance on both factions uniting behind a non partisan candidate to head the country as president Sharif announced his parties decision to cease from a coalition with the PPP on August 25th 2008 stating repeated broken promises by Asif Ali Zardari on resolving a judicial dispute and on who should be the next president. This was a cunning manoeuvre by Zardari to play Sharif against Musharraf, getting rid of one while isolating the other. The path was now clear for Zardari to put himself up for the top job of President. Mr 10 % was now to become Mr 100 per cent.

Of course such a view seems opinionated and open to vast scrutiny but what makes such sentiment is in the words of Dr Farzana Shaikh, of London's Chatham House think-tank, "the problem with Zardari is not that he is a unknown quantity it is he is a known quantity" and as the old proverb goes a leopard cannot change its spots. It remains to be seen how Zardari performs with troubles looming on all sides. The United States has moved quickly to make sure Zardari is in line with its war on terror strategy. Yet with the war spilling over into Pakistani borders recently the issue of Pakistani sovereignty has come to the foe with Zardari’s inaugural address siding very much with the American position. In relation to the much documented problems with the Taliban and Al-Qaida presence with in Pakistan Zardari made a bold statements presenting common ground with America on the issue. The response was brutal as a day later a car bomb decimated Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel sending a clear message to Zardari of the battle he faces. Secondly the issue of the army remains an everlasting problem for any elected official in Pakistan. Despite General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stating very clearly that he would make sure the army stayed out of politics such sentiments can never be relied upon especially with Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty at stake. After all it was differences between Sharif and Musharraf over Kargil and India’s incursions that led to the former being dismissed. And finally there’s the Bhutto curse. Having allied himself with the Bhutto name and legacy Zardari must also contend with its consequence that has seen so many prominent members of the family killed. Even in his inaugural speech as President Zardari was keen to highlight the Bhutto influence stating "I accept this position on behalf of my martyred wife.’ Given Zardari’s past record a return of any of these most unsavoury incidents of Pakistan’s history may be a blessing in disguise for the nation". Yet as with any aspect of Pakistan’s turbulent history watch this space.


Written for Hii Dunia by Faisal Hanif

Picture: Getty Images

Somalia: The Conception and Expansion of Patronage Networks

To fully understand the initial reasons for the expansion of the shadow economy in Somalia analysis needs to be directed to the colonial and Cold War era, where foreign powers held great influence over the Somali economy. In pre-colonial times Somalia was a relatively peaceful homogenous society that held very strong ties to the land. However, these were neglected by Italian and British colonisers, as Pietro Toggia and Pat Lauderdale writing in Columbia International Affairs Online point out; “land and its sacred identity of place was neglected by the colonialists with propriety of ownership and production becoming the central concept”.

Due to this negation by the colonial powers traditional trade relations between different clans within Somali were strained or destroyed. The major trade relationships that had served many of the Somali people well for centuries was between the primarily agricultural clans in the South that held territory in and around fertile river valleys and those that occupied drier regions and dealt mainly in livestock. Colonialism disrupted the trade between such groups as Somali’s were dictated to by their colonial administrators in order to create a situation of dependency upon their colonial power. The North of Somalia now the defacto state of Somaliland was affected differently from the South by their British colonisers. British colonialism did not employ the same coercive technique of breaking up trade routes as Italian colonialism. Instead they pursued their political and economic goals by keeping the native population underdeveloped to a degree. In many ways due to Cold War benefaction colonial dependency in Somalia did not end until the fall of the Barre regime. A further factor from the colonial era that has had recriminations today was the arbitrary drawing of a national boundary around the Somali clans, creating tensions that would have served the colonial powers divide and rule techniques well. When administering state boundaries the colonial powers showed little regard towards clan heritage and traditional living such as the nomadic lifestyle of some sub clans of the Darood, Ishaak, Hawiya and Dir that traditionally lived nomadically, sometimes venturing across borders into Ethiopia and Kenya establishing trade routes.

Cold War support for Somalia was mainly a reaction to politics within Ethiopia primarily concerned with the militarization of Somalia rather than the establishment of progressive politics. This meant that there was little social and political development made while arms were pouring into Somalia, as Stephen Zunes Professor of Peace and Justice at San Francisco University outlines in Foreign Policy in Focus “as the US poured in more than $50 million worth of arms annually to prop up the Barre regime, there was virtually no assistance offered that could help build a self-sustaining economy”.

During the Barre regime the official economy failed to diversify away from what Somalia’s colonial powers had dictated. Somalia’s trade was primarily regional with its main export markets being Saudi Arabia that brought much of Somalia’s exported beef, and Kenya. However, trade with both Kenya and Saudi Arabia was subject to irrational economic circumstances as both the Saudi Arabian and Kenyan border was shut to Somali trade at various times during the 1980’s. The Kenyan President of the day Daniel Moi shut of trade with Somalia periodically due to regional violence and instability. This had severe consequences for those who imported and exported the mild stimulus ‘qat’ that grows in the Kenyan highlands that is very popular with Somali’s.

Although the shadow economy was prevalent in Somalia prior to the collapse of the state in 1991, its growth was embedded within the collapsing of the regime. Western liberal policy advocated by the major International Financial Institutions (IFIs),( the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) dictates that a large shadow economy can lead states to collapse as governments raise taxes to increase their revenue that in turn causes a flight into the shadow economy, further weakening government authority. IMF researchers Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste claim “a heavily regulated economy combined with weak and discretionary administration of law provides especially fertile ground for shadow economy activities”. Initially the Barre regime followed a policy of heavily regulating the economy in line with their socialist doctrine. On the 8th May just one year after taking control the regime authorised guidelines for the tight control of the economy including the nationalisation of the Italo-Somali Electric Society (SEIS), oil distributing companies and all foreign banks. Such a situation was complicated in Somalia due to regime rule, a poor failing official economy, foreign aid, intervention, and clan rivalries. All of these factors enabled and led to the expansion of the shadow economy as Somali’s sought security and food.

Warlords are able to generate extra revenue through involvement with the illegal trade of qat, which according to a 2003 panel of UN experts has been used to generate revenue to buy weapons and prolong Somalia’s internal strife. Qat use increased dramatically after the outbreak of civil war possibly due to its virtues of escapism. International aid agencies have cited the use of qat, commonly known in Somalia as khat, as a primary cause of the continued fragmentation of Somali society as researchers have estimated 75 percent of adult males use the stimulus that has addictive properties that can lead men away from traditional family and work responsibilities.

When the Kenyan border closed Somalia entrepreneurs turned to the shadow economy in order to smuggle ‘qat’ across the Somali / Kenyan border to sell in provincial Somali markets. Through the illegal cross-border trade Somali smugglers were able to avoid paying tariff chargers and trade licenses for the ‘qat’ making it more lucrative to smuggle on the shadow economy than to import officially. As the Barre regime became increasingly oppressive, corrupt and de-legitimised, expansive networks began to form for shadow economic activity. By the late 1980s trading in small arms was prevalent within the Somali shadow economy as private Somali entrepreneurs often with links to the Barre regime sold small arms to Somali clans, and resistance fighters in regional states such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, at the same time as this upsurge in small arms sale upon the shadow economy the Barre regime was becoming increasingly violent towards political opponents with incidents of mass jailing, attack on civilians and the indiscriminate use of landmines in dissident regions as Julius Ihonvbere writing in ‘Somalia: The Real Background Issues’ claims that “the Majareeten, the Isaacs, and the Hawiye clans were ruthlessly suppressed.” Such action did not have the results the regime intended or expected as opposition to the Barre regime and inter-clan violence began to erupt. Moreover, increasing numbers of weaker minority clans and sub-clan groups became displaced from their territory, further worsening the official economy and security in Somali society.

Written by Lee Taylor

Photo Credit: Nasteex Faarax - AP

Links & Resources:

Covertaction.org - Michel Choussudovsky - 'The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World bank Reforms'

Foreign Policy in Focus - Stephen Zunes - 'Somalia as a Military Target' (Updated)

Hii Dunia - Somalia related articles

Review of the African Political Economy - Publications' Home Page

The Washington Post - 'Khat Trade Rules in Somalia'

Somalia: The Nature of the Conflict

Armed clashes were most destructive and widespread in Somalia between 1988-1992 due to the overthrowing of the Barre regime, extreme resource depravation and clans jostling for political position. However, throughout the course of the 1990s conflicts in Somalia altered radically. In the early 1990s conflict almost always was based upon inter-clan fighting, as the UNHCR reported “the first explosion came immediately in the wake of the fall of Mogadishu, when the victorious Hawiye started to kill all non Hawiye residents of the capital”. This was also the case in the South with widespread fighting between the Darood and Hawiye clans over control of territory and resources. The primary funding of such conflicts was through pillaging and looting defeated clan territories and villages. However, as early as late 1991 although generally more prevalent in the mid to late 1990s there was a sign that intra-clan quarrels would lead to further conflicts as the major Hawiye clan in Mogadishu split in two forming the ‘Abigal’ led by Ali Mahdi and the ‘Haber Gedir’ led by Hussein Farah Aideed. Such a split brought an onslaught of heavy fighting throughout various districts of the capital, making a quick restoration of peace impossible. Meanwhile, the Darood clan based in Southern Somalia also conceded to intra-clan fighting in and around the Southern coastal city of Kismayo. While inter-clan hostilities still prevailed in many other parts of the country such as at Baidoa between Rahanweyn and Hawiye clans. This has had a knock on affect upon ethnic topography that has become distorted in many parts of Somalia, especially the border regions due to migration and temporary settlement caused by the social strife resulting from clan conflict.

Throughout the 1990’s the break-up of different clan allegiances became the primary prerequisite for fighting. This had implications for Somalia’s battered social tissue. Atrocities against civilian populations began to decrease due to the localised nature of intra-clan conflict and the re-emergence of traditional based authority from clan elders, meaning that conflict crimes would be more likely to be punished through clan customary law (xeer) or the enforcement of blood payment (diya). Pillaging and looting also saw a decrease in intra-clan conflicts as less territory was gained in such clashes. This indicates that actions and interests in Somalia following the collapse of the Barre regime have not remained fixed. It could also be argued the change of conflicts from one based upon ethnicity to one based upon interests will give external actors more leverage in building peace.

Clan based political actors such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Front (SNF) that emerged following the overthrowing of the Barre regime have since retreated from the political agenda in Somalia. This is partly due to the fracturing of ethnic divides and the breaking up of numerous lead organizations. An example being, the split in the mid 1990s of the USC, into the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Similar fracturing has led to a weakening of support and power for many of the warlords and militias since the years immediately after 1991, making those groups that once benefited smaller and more fractured.

Ken Menkhaus a professor of Political Science at Davidson College North Carolina claims most businessmen who initially profiteered from conflict have made a transition into more legitimate goods and commercial networks. Professor Menkhaus writing in the Review of African Political Economy indicates that recent armed conflict in Somalia is not so much driven by economic interests directly linked to warfare but rather, “parochial political agendas of individual leaders engaged in power struggles.” Moreover as previously mentioned this is often within their own sub-clan. Menkhaus further argues in his article in the Review of African Political Economy that Somalia’s continual collapse cannot be explained only by greed interests as they would profit more from an internationally recognised ‘paper state’, allowing them to attract foreign aid that the elites could pocket as was the case with much of the aid that was given to Somalia during the 1990s. This however is not the desire of many Somali clans, militias and businessmen, as attempts to establish a transitional government in Somalia have been met with an increase in armed conflict, as many groups remain with the capacity to spoil a peace process.


Links & Resources:

ROAPE - Review of African Political Economy homepage.

UNHCR - 'Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawl 1990 -1995'

Links & Resources - September 2008

No More Aid?

The third grandly titled ‘High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness’ took place earlier this month in the Ghanaian capital Accra. Convened to increased aid effectiveness and transparency the forum looked at factoring new actors as well as criteria into the aid paradigm. These included broadening the range of civil society input and factoring in climate change to aid targets.

The promises made at the Accra forum led Development Industry to speculate of a World without the need for Aid Donors and Development Agencies.

The Better Aid blog has for the past week carried a host of articles detailing the events in Accra. Written by Nuria Molina in this article she heartenly applaudes the role played by civil societies at the conference.


Somalia

Throughout this month Hii Dunia is hosting a series of articles by Lee Taylor and others on the contemporary history of Somalia and the plight of its people.

This week the Frontline Club in London is hosting a series of events to draw attention to what it sees as the forgotten plight of Somalia. A series of screenings and talks culminate on Thursday 11th September with a Media Talk called ‘Somalia – War Within Wars’. Speakers include Sally Healy from the UK based think tank Chatham House and the editor of Africa Confidential Patrick Smith.

With more than 8000 Somalians killed by ongoing fighting in the last year many thousands more have fled and joined the already large Somali Diaspora that has found refuge in the World’s largest refugee camp at Dadaab just inside Kenya. The Guardian’s Xan Rice reported from the camp earlier this month. The camp and others are currently experiencing a rise in its numbers from those fleeing the latest civil instability within Somalia.


Children in Conflict

The ‘Forced Migration and Current Awareness Blog’ this month listed seven publications it sourced that have focused on the continued role of children in conflict and the lasting effects this can have on them.

From the Front Line last month carried an engaging article based on the work of CARE International highlighting the continued role of Children in the conflict in Eastern Chad and Darfur. The reporter David Axe wrote;

“...on June 20 this reporter observed several child soldiers in Chadian army service during a massive “friendly fire” incident in the eastern town of Gore. For two hours, elements of the Chadian army fought a running battle with other Chadian soldiers, each side apparently mistaking the other for Sudan-based rebel infiltrators.”


Other

Meanwhile, Kate over at the excellent Unpacking Development site is attending another conference. This site's knack at adding a personable touch to subjects or events that can otherwise appear distant or irrelevant is refeshing. Kate has recently attended the Medicine 2.0 conference in Toronto her experiences of the conference can be found here and here.